Domingo Bánez upholds the Essence and Existence real distinction and refutes Dun Scotus and the like

Second question: the distinction between esse and essence in created things, namely, whether esse is distinguished from essence.

Let us first consider the arguments for the negative side.

If esse is really distinct from essence, it follows that God can separate esse from essence, and conserve both, for, when two things are really distinct, nothing can make it impossible for God to conserve one without the other. Here the falsity of the consequent is immediately evident, for, if essence is conserved and exists and on the other hand we suppose that God separates esse from essence, we end in two contradictories: it does and does not have esse. By a similar reason, St. Thomas says, in q. 66, a. 1, that matter cannot be without form or else matter would exist actually without act, which is impossible.

Secondly, if esse is really distinct from essence, it follows that it would be pure act and thus would be God, for if esse is really distinct from essence, it is an act which does not include any potentiality. Thus, it is pure act. The antecedent is proved in that esse itself has no potency whatever, unless such a potency comes from esse being identified with essence; otherwise, if esse itself were to be composed of act and potency, there would be an infinite series.

Thirdly, if esse is really distinct from essence, it follows that it exists by itself, for the act of existing, since it includes no potency, cannot exist through another act. Thus, it exists through itself. This, however, is true of God alone.

Fourthly, if esse is really distinct from essence, it follows that immaterial substances are composed of esse and essence. The consequent is false, therefore.

The proof here is that whatever includes distinct things is a composite of them. The minor's proof is that it is impossible for an unum per se to result from two components, unless one of these components relates to the other as potency to its act, for from two actually existing things we do not get an unum per se, as Aristotle teaches in his second book of De Anima and the seventh book of the Metaphysics, text 49. Now in immaterial substances, clearly the esse cannot be the potency; nor can the essence, since this will then either be absolute or only relative potency. Now it cannot be absolute potency, since this would make it pure potency as prime matter; nor can it be relative potency, since what is relatively a potency, simply has to be actual. In that case the essence of an angel, apart from esse and precisely as distinct from esse, would simply be in actuality.

Fifthly, if there is a real distinction between esse and essence, it follows that the distinction obtains between two fundamentally real things. Now this consequent is false; therefore... The proof of this is that a real distinction is a real relation which necessarily exists between two extremes which really exist. The minor is proved in that essence, as distinct from existence, is not objectively actual and hence cannot be one extreme of the real distinction from existence, the other extreme.

Sixthly, if esse is really distinct from essence, it follows that in composite material things there is a two-fold real substantial composition, one of matter and form, another of esse and essence. Consequently the resulting composite would only be an unum per accidens.

Now, in this article St. Thomas explicitly teaches the opposite of all the preceding conclusions. He holds that God alone is His esse.

There are three main positions on this difficult point.

The first position asserts that esse and essence are by no means objectively distinguished in such a way. Rather, they are distinguished only conceptually with, however, a foundation in things. This sort of distinction is customarily called a reasoned mental distinction. Herveus holds this position in his Quod-libetales 7, q. 9, and Gabriel in his 3, d. 6, q. 2, Aureolus in Capreolus' I, d. 8, q. 1, and Durandus in I, Sent. d. 8, first part of the distinction, q. 2; as do all the nominalists. They hold that essence and esse are not any more different than race and running.

The second position is held by Scotus in 3 Sent., d. 6, q. 1, and Alexander of Hales in 7 Metaph., text 22, and Agostino Nifo in 4 Metaph., disputation 5. Master Soto also follows this opinion in 2 Physics, q. 2. These doctors say that existence and essence are distinct, not only mentally, but really formally, or "formally by the very nature of the thing," not as one thing from another thing, as Soto says in the text cited above. There are indeed strong reasons for this position, since by this procedure the authors of this position seem able to answer satisfactorily arguments against the extreme positions.

The third position holds that essence is distinct from esse as one thing from another thing, such that not only is the proposition "essence is esse" false formally, but also the proposition "essence is a thing which is esse." Capreolusa1 holds this position in 1, Dist. 8, q. 1, Cajetan in his brief work De Ente et Essentia, c. 5, q. 10, Ferrara in Cont. Gent., 2, c. 52, Soncinas in 4 Metaph. q. 12, Lavellus in his treatise on the transcendentals, c. 4, and it seems to be the opinion of St. Hilary in Bk. 6 of his De Trinitate, the place St. Thomas cites in his sed contra.

To decide now on the truth of the matter.

Let this stand as our first conclusion: essence and esse are not only distinct mentally. This position seems common to writers of noteworthy seriousness, both in philosophy and theology. In his brief work De Ente et Essentia, c. 5, and in Cont. Gent., 2, c. 52 and 53, St. Thomas holds this position. This conclusion is proved from Sacred Scriptures and the holy Fathers in the places already mentioned and in the preceding article. They attribute to God as proper and unique to Himself and His essence and esse are distinguished only mentally. Hence, the same should not be said of created things.

Secondly, this is proved in that the proposition "essence is esse in created things” is generally rejected by all theologians and philosophers and seems to be inadmissible, for it is unique to the divine essence that in a formal sense esse is predicated of it. Now if created esse is distinct from its essence only mentally, doubtless the same proposition would be true of it, just as divine essence, though mentally distinct from, is His own esse.

Thirdly, from the opposite position, it would follow that existence belongs essentially to creatures, so that "man exists" would be an essential proposition. The consequent is false, therefore. ... For that proposition is not an eternal truth, since before the creation of the world it was false. This is so, for no instance can be cited where some real act is identified really and formally with some thing without belonging and being intrinsic to that thing. Reason proves this, for, if the formal intelligibility of one thing is identical with the formal intelligibility of another thing, it is impossible for those two not to have an intrinsic and essential connection, hence, etc. Finally, this is proved in that, if essence is really identical with esse, it is hard to understand how the divine Word assumed humanity without a created existence, communicating to that humanity directly, not merely its personality, but also divine existence. St. Thomas holds this position explicitly in S.T. III, q. 17, a. 2, where he proves that in Christ our Lord there is only one esse, the divine existence.

Let this then stand as our second conclusion: it is much more probable and more in accord with Theology, to hold esse as really distinct from essence as one thing from another. This seems to be St. Thomas' position in the places cited above. The proof of this is that the constitutive mode of a supposit is really distinct from that supposit as one thing from another, as was said in the preceding article. All the more distinct then is esse from essence, for esse does not come to essence except through suppositality. Esse itself is the proper act of the supposit, as St. Thomas teaches in II, q. 17, a. 2. Also, the constitutive mode of the supposit is more intrinsic to that supposit than esse, for that mode is in the definition of a supposit, while esse is not: only an intrinsic order to esse is in every being. Secondly, esse is received from an efficient cause and depends upon it for both becoming and conservation, while essence belongs directly and properly to the creature without dependence on an efficient cause, for it is eternally true that to be a man is compatible with Peter. But that Peter exists is due to the efficient cause. Thus, esse cannot be the same thing as essence. Thirdly, a true potency and a true act are really distinct just like matter and form. Now essence is a true potency with respect to the act of existing. Therefore, the two are really distinct as one thing from another.

Fourthly, if the esse of a creature were the same thing as its essence, it would follow that esse is not really received in essence, for the same thing is not received into itself. Now if esse indeed were not received in essence, it would be unlimited and infinite simply, even as God Himself, for esse cannot be limited by some other act, as we saw in the preceding section. Against Durandus, the point is quite effectively proven in 1 Sent., d. 8, that essence is at least really and formally distinct from esse. This is confirmed, since divine essence is precisely infinite because it is really and formally His esse. Thus, if the essence of a creature were its own esse, it would not have a limited esse, nor indeed a received existence.

Finally, this conclusion is proved in that, if we may so put it, we understand the mystery of the Incarnation better, since the humanity is drawn not only to the personality of the Word, but also to His existence, according to the more probable opinion. It would be awkward to maintain that the humanity of Christ is actualized by divine esse and by another created esse.

At any rate, let this be our last conclusion: Scotus' opinion and that of Master Soto, cited in the second place above, which differ little from the position we have just explained, can be held with probability.

The arguments against it by those who hold the third opinion can be answered by this illustration. Figure actuates quantity and terminates it, and quantity is related as a potency to figure, yet figure and quantity are not really distinct as one thing from another, but formally from the nature of a thing, or really formally as they say; or, they are distinct as thing and mode of a thing, as, when one bends a rod, it does not seem that he has produced anything really distinct from the rod's quantity, but rather that he has effected the mode of the quantity. However, we are following St. Thomas' position as Capreolus and Cajetan understand it.

Here then are our answers to the arguments presented above.

We counter the first argument by denying the inference. By proceeding that way you could prove that prime matter can exist without form and that a vital activity can exist without a vital principle, which are contradictions. We say then that even though these two principles are distinct as one thing from another, since one of them has an intrinsic order of dependence on the other for its existence, that one cannot be conserved without this other. Since essence as existing depends on received esse, it is a contradiction to maintain that it exists without existence.

We answer the second argument by denying the inference. The answer to the proof presented is that esse itself, although it is really distinct from essence, is nevertheless limited in that it is received in essence. Hence, it is not pure act. The imperfection of potentiality, however, does not belong to esse by reason of itself but because it can be received. And in this it differs from uncreated esse, which is not distinguished from essence.

We answer the third argument by rejecting the inference for the same reasons.

We answer the fourth argument by admitting the inference but denying the minor. The major premise in the proof is admitted, the minor denied. Essence in immaterial things, except God, is as potency in relation to esse. Now, is this relative or pure potency?

The answer is that the essence of a substance is not pure potency in the way that prime matter is pure potency in relation to substantial form. Nevertheless, the essence itself of a thing is absolute potency in relation to the act of existing. Nor is it unintelligible that this same essence should at the same time have its own specific formality intrinsically, since it has this in virtue of its intrinsic order to esse as to its first and last actuality. As St. Thomas says in the Quaestio Unica de Anima, art. 6, ad 3, there is nothing to prevent one form from relating to another form as potency ordered to its act. Diaphaneity, for instance, with regard to light is potency to its proper act and yet that diaphaneity itself is the form of the diaphanous body. In the same way, the essence of an angel, even though it is a subsistent form, still is absolute potency in relation to esse, even though it has its own formality, by means of which it determines esse itself in a more perfect way than material things.

The answer to the proof in the fifth argument is that the essence itself is an actual part of the thing but is actuated through existence, which is really distinct from it, in the same way that matter and form are really distinct and that between them there is a real relation.

As for the sixth argument, I concede the inference, but I deny that it is unacceptable to posit in material things one physical composition of matter and form, and another composition, a metaphysical one, of esse and essence. Nor is the result of this an accidental unity, since what results from the physical composition of matter and form is the potential principle in the metaphysical composition of essence and esse, since esse itself actuates the entire substance composed of matter and form. Thus, there is a great difference between these two compositions. The first is one of intrinsic and essential parts, while the other is a composite of the entire essence and a principle other than essence, which actuates it and comes precisely as the actualization from nothingness of that whole creatable essence. Thus, esse is not a part of essence but is received in essence.

Finis.

Taken from Scholastica Commentaria in Prinam Partem Angelici Doctoris ad Sexagesimam Quartem Quesionem, Salmanticae 1584. - Trans. Benjamin S. Llamzon